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AMERICAN BUSINESS AND RISK CAPITAL
EMIL SCHRAM

*

In the midst of a nation-wide.business surge-in building, in steel, in
automobiles and petroleum production and farming-our capital markets stand
alone as the one "depressed area" in the national economy.
It is due to the failure of many of those who call the tune on our country's
fiscal and credit policies to realize that they are sluicing off the top soil from
a resource as definite and tangible as our farms; they are eroding something as measurable as our grazing lands; they are pumping off onto barren
ground something as exhaustible as our oil wells.
I am speaking of that peculiarly American resource-the willingness and
ability of our people to take risks in the hope of profit if they but be given
the opportunity.
In simple truth our whole history has been enacted against a back-drop
lettered with the words: "Nothing ventured, nothing gained." Yet, what account is being taken today of the dynamics of risk capital as the driving force
of our national economy?
The only purpose for which capital markets exist, whether in New York,
or in Chicago, or in St. Louis, or in Tulsa, is to bring togpther the investable
funds of the people and the instruments in which those funds may be employed. Money left idle is merely a store of value, or a claim on goods and
services. Surplus funds are placed in the hands of those who build public
works-through the purchase of municipal, state and federal bonds. They
go into the building of dams or steam generating systems-through the purchase of public utility securities. They go into railroad property-through
railroad bonds or shares. They go into farm property-through the vehicle
of the farm mortgage. They drill oil wells, build steel mills and factories,
develop mines, construct ships, make possible new and useful chemical
processes, and provide the funds to establish those many new enterprises
without which there could be no progress.
At present, and for some time, Wall Street has been finding a ready
market for bonds, notes, mortgages and non-risk securities, or, perhaps
more accurately, securities thought to involve smaller risks. At present, and
for some time, however, both Wall Street and corporations seeking new
venture capital have encountered a reluctant market for stocks. In other words,
there is plenty of "sacred money" available for investment, but a real shortage
of "risk" money, or venture capital. This, of course, is far from an ideal
condition in a dynamic economy.
In 1945, when the stock market was good, 52 per cent of all the new money
raised publicly by corporations was obtained through the sale of common
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and preferred stocks. In 1946, when the stock market was active and strong
only a few months, 42 per cent of the money came from the sale of stocks; but
in 1947, when earnings were higher than in either year, only 26 per cent of new
funds were derived from the sale of shares and 74 per cent came from the
sale of bonds and notes.
0
At present, not a few leading corporations have reached the point where
they will not attempt to obtain equity capital. They still need capital funds,
but market conditions are unfavorable to the sale of additional shares.
Today, scores of leading companies would like to sell additional
shares to obtain money to buy machinery, erect plants and augment working
capital. However, the market for equity securities is so anemic that it can absorb only a limited volume of new shares.
Never before has there been a time in stock market history when the
stock market has declined so long and so far without the decline being accompanied by a decline in business and earnings. It is now 25 months since
the peak of the 1946 bull market and 18 months since the September, 1946,
decline in prices; yet the Federal Reserve Board Index of Production is at or
near its post-war peak.
All the evidence, it seems to me, justifies a recent observation that the
trend in stock prices temporarily has become divorced from the trend in
business. The only reason for this divorcement in trend, I think, is that
those who in the past have supplied the risk capital for American business
are unable to accumulate money under the present tax structure or that they
are unwilling to invest when the prospects for a reasonable return are so poor.
Again this can be blamed upon our tax policies. The sources of venture capital have dried up or have backed away because the incentives are no longer
present.
The great danger in all of this is that, unless conditions are reversed, there
may be a return to large-scale government financing. That would be the
road leading to the nationalization of industry and business. Government
financing, for certain projects, but not all of them that we went into, was
desirable and necessary in the days of deep depression of the early thirties.
Government financing was necessary during the war emergency. Unfortunately, our people, including many of our business men, got into the habit of
looking to the government for the solution of their financial problems.
We simply must break ourselves of this habit. In order to do so,
we must restore our private capital markets to full and vigorous health. That
means prompt and resolute action on the part of Congress. The present tax
legislation is merely one step in the direction of a thorough correction of the
situation which is responsible for the stagnation of our markets. I am hopeful
that Congress will, in the second tax bill, which is already taking shape, see to it
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that the incentives essential to investment and risk-taking are supplied as soon
as possible.
I appeared before the Senate Finance Committee on March 10, 1948,
particularly for the purpose of directing attention to the problems arising out
of the alarming shortage of equity capital. As I told the Committee, our tax
structure, even in the modified form as presented to the two houses of Congress, simply does not permit those who in the past have invested in business and in securities representing venture investment to supply industry with
the type of funds which it needs.
Wealth has aged noticeably in the past fifteen years and older people
who are living on pensions, trust funds and accumulated or inherited capitaland there are a lot of them-are really having a struggle to keep their heads
above water. There are some, termed rich, who, in order to maintain within
reasonable limits their customary standard of living, to educate their children,
,etc., are actually using principal to meet the deficit, which really means, in
large measure, to pay their taxes.
Business was fortunate in entering the post-war period in an extremely
liquid position, but as a result of higher prices and an expansion of operations,
cash and equivalent have run off considerably. The working capital position
of industry is worsening; the extent to which this is taking place is being
obscured temporarily by the sale of capital securities, in large part debt
securities.
Of $4.75 billion new money raised publicly by corporations through the
capital markets last year, common and preferred stocks represented only onequarter, or $1.2 billion. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, common stocks totalled but $784 million. Toward the closing months of
the year, common stock offerings were largely confined to the larger com-panies in the public utility and oil industries, while the market was virtually
-non-existent where other stock offerings were involved. Time and time again
the report of anticipated common stock financing was sufficient to depress
sseverely the stocks of even the strongest and most successful corporations.
The stock market is also suffering from persistent foreign liquidation
and the effects of sales of large holders, brought about, in many instances,
by tax factors, adding to the supply of stocks without any sufficient offset
from new risk funds.
The volume of trading on the New York Stock Exchange last year, as a
-percentage of the mean number of shares listed, was down to 14 per cent, the
lowest since 1942. This year to March 1, the reported volume of trading on the
New York Stock Exchange amounted to 37,018,892 shares against 47,314,680
shares in the same period of 1947, a reduction of 22 per cent. In the first two
months of this year the volume of trading was at the annual rate of about 12
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per cent of the number of shares listed, and only slightly above the 1942 rate
which was 9 per cent-the lowest on record.
At the outset I said to the Senate Finance Committee that the risk capital
problem falls into two parts: the adequate flow of such capital, and its proper
function. I made two proposals that I think will make risk capital function.
Neither proposal involves any appreciable loss of revenues. I refer:
1. to the injustices of the double taxation of dividends which are the
reward for risk-taking; and
2. to the capital gains and losses provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
which, to repeat, are a feature of the tax structure not intended to
be a revenue producer.
I recommended that the maximum effective rate of taxation on longterm capital gains be reduced from 25 per cent to not in excess of 122
per cent. I do not exaggerate in the slightest degree when I say that our
markets are in such an unsatisfactory condition as to be a matter of concern
to all of us.
My concern with the position of the equity investor and the capital market
arises primarily out of my earnest desire for a continued high level of employ-'
ment and economic progress. Jobs tnderlie revenues, capital values, and almost
every other economic consideration. I can think of no other way of promoting
continued high employment with a minimum of loss to the Treasury than to
stimulate the flow of risk capital.
To enable the capital markets to perform their economic function properly
is not to invite a repetition of the practices of the twenties. Effective controls
preclude this possibility. It is most desirable, however, to reverse the trend of
the dormant and stagnant thirties, and to resume the path of economic progress
which characterized the American economy until attention was concentrated
more on the division of the national product rather than on its size. Funds for
business expansion cannot be met entirely through the generation of funds
through internal sources, and-we must:
1. make it possible for the groups which are the traditional source of
venture capital to accumulate funds; and
2. provide incentives for them to invest such funds profitably.
The only other course is to have the Government provide the funds.
Nowhere has this policy been compatible with the maintenance of initiative
and incentive, and, in the end, of freedom.

